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Abstract
Blockchain has emerged as a leading technology that en-
sures security in a distributed framework. Recently, it has
been shown that blockchain can be used to convert tra-
ditional blocks of any deep learning models into secure
systems. In this research, we model a trained biometric
recognition system in an architecture which leverages the
blockchain technology to provide fault tolerant access in a
distributed environment. The advantage of the proposed ap-
proach is that tampering in one particular component alerts
the whole system and helps in easy identification of ‘any’
possible alteration. Experimentally, with different biomet-
ric modalities, we have shown that the proposed approach
provides security to both deep learning model and the bio-
metric template.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in biometrics have made face, finger-
print, and iris authentication systems ubiquitous. These
modalities are popular choices for large scale person iden-
tification. One example of such a scheme is India’s Aad-
haar project1 where officials collect and store the biometric
data of citizens to identify individuals at later stages. In
these nation wide projects, there are two possibilities for
data storage, either in a central server or in a distributed
system. Storing all the collected data on a central server is
reasonable in the sense that it requires the involvement of
minimum people and hence chances of an external attack
such as template tampering are minimum. However, this
modeling choice comes at risks including system failure or
an unexpected disk error that may cause some of the data to
get corrupted. The other modeling option is to have a dis-
tributed system. Distributed systems ensure minimum loss
in case of system failure but are hard to trust because of
the number of entities involved in the process (mutual dis-
trust between entities is a common problem in a distributed
framework). An ideal solution to this conundrum is to guar-
1https://uidai.gov.in/
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Figure 1. Traditional biometrics recognition system which is vul-
nerable at multiple points and the proposed approach to secure the
system.
antee a sense of trust and consensus in the distributed set-
ting. This problem was first addressed by Nakamoto [18] in
the context of the digital currency, Bitcoin. Nakamoto pro-
posed to replace trust with cryptographic proofs that vali-
date a particular transaction in a blockchain. Over the years,
many protocols have been developed that address the prob-
lem of achieving consensus in an unreliable and distributed
environment.
As identified by Ratha et al. [21], biometric systems
are vulnerable to external attacks. They identified various
attack/vulnerability levels in a typical biometrics recogni-
tion pipeline including input, feature, matching, and deci-
sion stages. Figure 1 shows the basic blocks of the biomet-
rics recognition system and points where the attacks can be
performed. A lot of research work has been done in craft-
ing and defending against adversarial attacks at input level
[4, 9]. For example, Carlini and Wagner [6] and Chen et
al. [7] have devised adversarial attacks that produce imper-
ceptible yet deleterious input perturbations in a white-box
framework. Researchers have proposed techniques to detect
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and mitigate the effects of these input level perturbations on
facial images [2, 14, 15]. Goel et al. [12] have developed a
toolbox to benchmark adversarial detection and mitigation
algorithms for face recognition.
Recently, researchers have been analyzing the implica-
tions of incorporating decentralized blockchain technology
with biometrics systems. Butchman et al. [5] have proposed
the security of breeder documents through blockchain. The
biometric data captured from the subject is stored on the
breeder document; the hash function of the report is com-
puted and saved as a block in the blockchain. Nandakumar
et al. [19] have proposed the implementation of a concept
called biometrics token. The token can be used a single
time, and deduplication and multiple uses of the token can
be avoided through blockchain hash function. The combi-
nation of biometrics and blockchain is in its novice phase.
Gracia [10] have shown the possibility of combining bio-
metrics through blockchain to be implemented on a dis-
tributed system. Similarly, Delgado-Mohatar et al. [8] have
presented a view of how biometrics and blockchain can be
combined to benefit each other. Zhou et al. [24] have pro-
posed the simple, auditable scheme for authentication of the
fingerprint-based recognition system. These recent works
have introduced the concept of blending these technologies
for better security purposes. Other than the combination of
biometrics and blockchain, in different fields such as smart
energy [3, 17], healthcare [13], and intelligent devices [23]
blockchain have shown some advantages.
Progressing the efforts to enhance security and attaining
consensus in a suspicious environment, in this research, we
present a biometric recognition architecture which uses a
private blockchain to extract features. The extracted fea-
tures are passed to a Merkle-tree type structure which per-
forms template matching in a decentralized yet secure en-
vironment. The salient contribution of this research is the
development of a secure deployable system which uses the
parameters of a learned model and an amalgamation of bio-
metrics and blockchain technology which is not only au-
ditable but also transparent in its decision making task.
2. Blockchain
Blockchain is a combination of blocks where each block
consists of data and metadata such as the hash of the data
and pointer to the hash of the previous block. The es-
sential primitives of the blockchain include cryptography,
hash function, transitive hash pointers, and digital signa-
tures. Cryptography provides the way for secure commu-
nication in the presence of an adversary which can steal
the sensitive data stored in the device. The hash function
helps in mapping the data of arbitrary size to a fixed size of
encrypted data. The significant properties of a hash func-
tion which makes them desirable for implementation are:
(i) collision avoidance: two different inputs cannot produce
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Figure 2. The transitivity of the hash function involved in the
blockchain.
the same output and (ii) deterministic hiding: the random
encrypted data will match to the corresponding information
even if they look entirely random. These are the properties
which make the blockchain tamper-resistant. The transitive
hash function helps in identifying the locations of possible
changes in the data. The transitive nature can be seen in
Figure 2. Due to the connection of blocks through the hash
function, any modification in the data will lead to the change
in the hash function of the data and ultimately the final hash.
The hash pointers also ensure the integrity of the ‘ledger’.
The final primitive of the blockchain is the digital signa-
ture. In the digital signature, the owner encrypts the data
using the private key and can only be validated through the
corresponding public key. The authenticated person is held
responsible for signing the data using the private key. Hard
to counterfeit property of digital signature makes it fault-
tolerant.
3. Architecture of the Proposed Approach
In this section, we propose an amalgamation of a private
blockchain with the biometrics recognition system. The
proposed architecture is shown in Figure 3 and has the fol-
lowing components:
3.1. Feature Extractor
Feature extractor extracts the matchable template from
the supplied image. Each step of the feature extraction pro-
cess is emulated as a single block of a private blockchain.
The blocks in the chain may or may not follow the proper
sequential order. The chain also has a notary block at the
end which helps maintain sanity in the network.
ith block of this chain contains the following:
• HASHi : Hash of the ith block
• Pubi,Privi : Public and Private keys of the ith block
• PubN : Public key of the notary
• AESi : AES key of the block
• paramsi : Parameters required to complete the pro-
cessing step
• HASHi−1 :Hash of the previous block
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Figure 3. Proposed biometrics recognition architecture with advanced features of blockchain.
Hash of any block is a function of the hash of the previ-
ous block and the parameters of the tasks performed by the
current block.
HASHi = Φ(HASHi−1, paramsi) (1)
Here Φ is any appropriate cryptographic hash function.
The feature extractor can be seen as a typical convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) where each layer can be mod-
eled as a block of the blockchain system [11].
3.1.1 Notary Block
Notary block is the last block of the feature extraction chain.
It serves the following purposes: (i) it ensures that the in-
formation passes through the proper route and (ii) it makes
sure that the data in the previous blocks has not been tam-
pered. Notary block does not have any parameters of its
own, and hence its hash is only a function of the hash of the
previous block.
HASHN = Φ(HASHN−1) (2)
Apart from its own AES, public and private keys, the
block also holds a list of the public keys of all the blocks
in the network in the proper sequential order and the public
key of the root of the template matcher tree.
3.2. Template Matcher
Template matcher matches the extracted features from
the provided sample with the gallery of templates and re-
turns the decision of the biometrics recognition process.
The matcher is mirrored as a tree where just like a Merkle
tree, the hash of the parent is the sum of the hash of all its
children. The tree has the following levels:
• Root level: This level contains only a single block
called the root block. This block is responsible for
declaring the final decision of the recognition process.
• Chief level: Blocks in this level consult with the leaves
to reach a decision consensus and then send this deci-
sion to the root block.
• Leaf level: Blocks in this level contain the templates of
the gallery and perform the actual template matching
process. They share their results with their correspond-
ing chief node to reach a final consensus decision.
Each root-chief link corresponds to an asymmetric deci-
sion key pair. The root divides the private key of the pair
into 2 ∗ n+ 1 shards using the Shamir’s [22] secret sharing
principle2 A total of n+2 shards are required to reconstruct
the key. The root keeps n of these shards with itself and
gives the remaining of the shards to the chief. The chief
provides each leaf block with a single shard and keeps re-
maining of the shards with itself.
As explained above, hash of chief blocks would be the
sum of hashes of all its leaves and hash of the root block
would be the sum of hashes of all the chiefs. The root and
the chief blocks also hold a copy of the original hash values
of their children. This helps in tracking the faulty leaf in
case of a tampering attack on the templates.
4. Working of the Proposed Approach
In this section we describe the working of both the fea-
ture extractor and the template matcher.
4.1. Feature Extractor
The captured data from the sensor is encrypted using the
public key of the notary and updated on the ledger. Ledger
after the update is represented as follows:
(encryptPubN (captured data))
The notary recognises an update of this sort as the start
of a new query cycle. It decrypts the encrypted data using
its own private key and encrypts it back using its AES key.
X0 = decryptPrivN (encryptPubN (captured data)) (3)
ED1 = encryptAESN (X0) (4)
2Here n is the maximum number of leaf nodes allowed.
In order to allow only the next sequential block to be able
to decrypt this value, the notary encrypts its own AES key
using the public key of the next in line block.
Suppose the next step (first step in this case) in the ex-
traction pipeline corresponds to block i, then:
EK1 = encryptPubi(AESN ) (5)
It also encrypts a start message using the public key of
the next block to let it know that the update is meant for
him.
EM1 = encryptPubi(start message) (6)
Lastly, the notary produces its own digital signature by
signing a universal message using its own private key.
S1 = encryptPrivN (message) (7)
Notary updates the ledger with (ED1, EK1, EM1, S1).
After the ledger update, all the blocks in the chain verify if
it is their turn to act. They do this by verifying the encrypted
start message.
Each block j in the chain asserts the following:
assert(decryptPrivj (EM1) == start message) (8)
This assertion is true only for the ith (the intended)
block. After the start message verification, the ith block
verifies whether the update has been made by the notary.
The block does not proceed further if this signature verifi-
cation fails.
assert(decryptPubN (S1) == message) (9)
The above two assertions ensure the following:
• Last ledger update was made by the notary.
• Notary has directed the ith block to continue with the
computation.
After successfully completing the processing steps, let
the output produced be O1. Ledger update by block i cor-
responds to the following set of equations:
ED2 = encryptAESi(O1)
EK2 = encryptPubN (AESi)
EM2 = encryptPubN (start message)
S2 = encryptPrivi(message)
The notary picks up this update and proceeds in a similar
approach. This cycle between the blocks and the notary
continues until the final feature vector is produced. In this
case, instead of using the public key of any of the blocks of
the extractor chain, the notary updates the ledger using the
public key of the template matching tree.
4.2. Template Matching
After successful feature vector computation, the root of
the matching tree receives the encrypted version of the tem-
plate. It decrypts it and forwards it to all of its chief blocks.
The chief blocks further send it to all of their leaf blocks.
Leaf blocks decrypt the feature vector and compare it with
the stored template using an appropriate measure such as the
Euclidean distance or the cosine similarity. Each leaf block
shares their score with their chief block. The chief block
analyses the scores of all the blocks and prepares a decision
document with the identity and the rating of the template
with the maximum match (e.g. minimum Euclidean dis-
tance score) to share with the root. Before sharing with the
root, the chiefs share the document with the leaves for their
consent. Leaves check if the distance score in the document
is less than their score. If the score in the document is in-
deed less than their score, then from their perspective the
document is proper. Leaves consent by providing the chief
with their shard of the decision key. If however, the score in
the decision document is greater than the score of the leaf
block, then that particular block does not consent and turns
its flag ‘ON’. After consenting with the leaves, the chief
adds its shards to the pool and provides the final decision
and the collected shard pool to the root. If the root recon-
structs the private decision key by adding one more shard to
the pool, then consensus has been reached. However, if that
is not the case, the root checks the score of all the leaves
with an ‘ON’ flag and compares it with the score in the de-
cision document to get the template with maximum simi-
larity from that particular path. After receiving and validat-
ing the most similar templates from each of the chiefs, the
root decides the match by choosing the most similar tem-
plate. This distributed system provides transparency in the
decision-making process.
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security mechanism of the
proposed architecture.
Proposition 1. A compromised chief node in the template
matching tree can never receive consensus while drafting a
decision document.
Proof. A total of n + 2 shards are required to achieve con-
sensus in the decision-making process. n+1 of these shards
come from the chief and the leaf blocks. The root provides
the remaining 1 shard. If the decision document is faulty,
there would be at least one leaf block who would have re-
ceived a distance score less than the one mentioned in the
document. This block will not consent and will not give its
shard to the chief block. Therefore, the maximum number
of shards that the chief can collect is n. It would require
the root to provide an additional shard to construct the de-
cision key and in case of mismatch, consensus cannot be
achieved.
• Adversaries try to query/intercept the feature ex-
tractor midway: Several attack techniques have been
devised which monitor the functioning of the feature
extraction process by analyzing the magnitude and
flow of the gradients to construct a sample which
would result in model failure. For this, they either
need to query or intercept the information flow mid-
way. The proposed model does not allow either of the
two. Querying the model midway would result in re-
quest rejection since the notary would not have signed
the query. Intercepting the information flow midway
would not work either since the attacker does not pos-
sess the required keys to decrypt the layer output.
• Parameters of the feature extractor blocks are com-
promised: Hash of a feature extractor block depends
on both the parameters of the block and the hash of
the previous block. If the block parameters get com-
promised, the hash of the block changes. It triggers
a change in the hash of the next block and finally
changes the hash of the notary. Hence, a change in
the hash of the notary signifies that parameters of any
of the block have been compromised. It can be recti-
fied by figuring out the first block whose hash does not
match with the hash that it had in the last stable state.
• Templates are compromised: Hash of the leaves of
the template matching tree depend on the templates
they hold. A change in them would correspond a
change in the hash values which would correspond
a change in the hash of the chief and ultimately the
root. After detecting a change in the hash of itself,
the root scrutinizes by finding the chief node whose
hash change triggered its hash change. The faulty chief
node repeats the same practice to find out the faulty
leaf node. The faulty leaf node is forced to revert to its
last stable state by restoring the correct template.
• A chief block in the template matching tree is com-
promised: A compromised chief block would try to
pass over an incorrect decision document to the root.
However, to get it passed, it would require the con-
sensus of all the leaves. Proposition 1 shows that it is
impossible for such a block to achieve consensus. It
triggers scrutiny from the root who identifies the leaf
with its flag turned on (most similar template).
• A leaf block is compromised: All the leaf blocks
must consent to receive n + 2 total shards. A compro-
mised leaf block would not agree to a valid decision
document and would trigger scrutiny from the root.
The scrutiny would reveal that the decision document
was valid and the decision-making process would go
on.
6. Experiments
Experiments are performed to present the efficacy and
security of the proposed model using face and fingerprint
modalities. The results of face identification are reported
using a subset of CMU Multi-PIE Face Database [16]
and Multiple Encounters Database (MEDS-II) database [1].
Multi-PIE database is a collection of 750,000 images of
337 subjects captured under 15 viewpoints and 19 illumi-
nation conditions in four different recording sessions. In
this research, the subset of the database has been used with
50248 frontal images of all the subjects. The subset con-
tains at least 40 frontal images for each identity. MEDS
database is collected from 518 subjects and contains 1,309
frontal images of each subject. The results of fingerprint
identification are reported on a subset of CASIA fingerprint
database3. CASIA fingerprint database contains 500 finger-
prints of each of the 4000 subjects. The subset considered
for the experiments consists of 100 subjects with 10 finger-
prints each.
We use a pre-trained CNN network, VGG-Face model
[20], as the feature extractor and model each of its layer as
a block of the chain. The parameters of the block include
the kernels, biases and the activation function for the con-
volution layers, pool size for the max-pooling layers and
weights, biases and activation function for the dense lay-
ers. We use the python implementation of Shamir’s secret
sharing4 to implement key sharding.
Each of the dataset is divided into training and testing
sets in a 4:1 ratio using stratified random sampling. The
VGG network is fine-tuned by freezing the weights of the
first nineteen layers and re-learning the weights of the re-
maining layers of the model. We chose the fully con-
nected dense layer with 4096 units as our template vector.
For n subjects, the constructed template matcher tree has
dn//50e5 chief blocks. Each but the last block has 50 leaves
and the last chief block has 50 leaves if dn//50e equaled
n//50 and n%50 leaves otherwise. The gallery is con-
structed by choosing a random image of each subject and
then by passing it through the trained model to generate the
template. Each of the gallery templates is stored in a leaf
of the template matcher tree. In our implementation, each
leaf holds just one template corresponding to a particular
subject in the dataset. Face and fingerprint identification is
performed by matching the gallery and probe templates us-
ing the following distance metrics: (i) Cosine similarity and
(ii) Euclidean distance.
3http://biometrics.idealtest.org/index.jsp
4https://github.com/lamby/python-gfshare
5// refers to integer division and % refers to remainder operation.
Table 1. Rank 1 identification accuracy (%) before and after template tampering on both the architectures.
Dataset Metric
Rank 1 Accuracy (%)
Before Template Tampering After Template Tampering
Traditional Architecture Proposed Architecture Traditional Architecture Proposed Architecture
MultiPIE Cosine 90.79 90.79 3.44 90.79
MEDS Euclidean 70.37 70.37 0 70.37
CASIA Cosine 95.39 95.39 70.81 95.39
Results with best performing distance metric is reported.
To show the security and self-correcting nature of the
system, the templates are perturbed using Gaussian noise.
The effect of this perturbation is measured on both the tra-
ditional and the proposed architectures. Figure 4 shows the
cumulative match characteristics curves (CMC) before and
after template tampering on both the architectures on the
MEDS database. It is evident that template tampering re-
duces the performance of traditional designs significantly,
whereas it does not affect the proposed model. Further, Ta-
ble 1 shows the rank-1 identification accuracies on all three
databases using traditional and proposed biometrics recog-
nition system. On the Multi-PIE database, when the cosine
distance measure is used for identifying, both the traditional
and proposed architecture yield 90.79% accuracy. The ad-
vantage of the combination of blockchain in biometrics sys-
tem can be seen when the tampering is performed. In the
traditional network case, the model suffers more than 87%
drop in the identification accuracy. On the other hand, due
to the property of blockchain, the model and template are
protected against tampering and same identification accu-
racy is maintained.
Similarly, on the MEDS face database and the CA-
SIA fingerprint database, the traditional architectures yield
70.37% (euclidean) and 95.39% (cosine) rank-1 identifica-
tion accuracies, respectively. Due to the lack of any security
features in the traditional architectures, the models suffer a
huge performance drop after tampering. However, the pro-
posed blockchain incorporated CNN models retain the orig-
inal identification accuracies in both the case studies.
7. Time Complexity
In a distributed framework, the time needed by the tem-
plate matcher will be: Time to delegate to the leaves + Time
to conduct a template match + Time to compare n values +
Time taken to carry out Shamirs secret (x) + Time taken to
compare c values (n: number of leaf nodes and c: number
of chief nodes). Assuming constant time to delegate to the
leaves, dimensions of the template as a × b, and Euclidean
distance as the matching score, the overall complexity is:
O(ab) + O(n) + O(x) + O(c). The power consumption of
the proposed system is similar to the traditional system.
8. Conclusion
In a “security-trust model”, it is easier to trust a com-
munity, where a decision is made only when a majority
Figure 4. Results of face identification(%) on the MEDS dataset.
of the community agrees, than to trust a particular individ-
ual. It is one of the motivations behind using a distributed
framework for biometric template matching. Inspired from
this, in this research, we have developed a self-correcting,
template and parameter tamper-proof blockchain architec-
ture for biometrics recognition. The proposed deep learning
model is able to protect different stages of the biometrics
recognition pipeline, specifically feature extraction, match-
ing, and template storage. Experiments on face and finger-
print modalities showcase the effectiveness of the proposed
approach. One of the key limitations of the proposed model
is computation time because cryptographic computations,
especially symmetric key encryption, and decryption are
very demanding operations. They provide undeniable secu-
rity but take some time to compute. As an extension to this
work, we plan to develop a distributed framework which is
not very resource hungry and has a time complexity similar
to the traditional architecture.
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